The absence of any authority above states: no world government, which is not the same as chaos. For Waltz, this makes international politics a self-help system, in which each state must look after its own survival.
In the game: Round 1
Waltz (1979)
Key terms from the Balance of Power lecture, and where each one appears in the game.
No term matches that.
The absence of any authority above states: no world government, which is not the same as chaos. For Waltz, this makes international politics a self-help system, in which each state must look after its own survival.
In the game: Round 1
Waltz (1979)
A nebulous term: it can mean a distribution of power, a policy of keeping power even, or a system that tends towards equilibrium. Scholars have argued for many different conceptions of the concept, and continue to do so.
In the game: The Scales: the coalition on one side, the Rising Power and its supporters on the other.
PowerPoint: Definitions of Balance
Countering a stronger state, either by building up one's own strength (internal balancing) or by allying with others (external balancing). Walt adds that states balance against the most threatening state, not simply the strongest.
In the game: Option A, Balance.
Waltz (1979); Walt (1987).
the anarchic structure of the system pushes states to balance, so balances tend to form whether or not anyone intends them
In the game: Round I tests it: does a balance form in silence?
Waltz (1979)
A realist tradition that roots international politics in human nature and the pursuit of power, and stresses the prudence of statesmen. Morgenthau treats the balance of power as both a near-inevitable outcome of power politics and a policy to be pursued through skilful diplomacy.
In the game: Round II tests it: does talking make the difference?
Morgenthau (1948)
Great powers maximise their relative power, because the best guarantee of survival is to be "the only great power in the system". As global hegemony is near impossible, they aim for regional hegemony and to stop rivals achieving it elsewhere.
In the game: The Rising Power's opening line.
Mearsheimer (2001)
A state with overwhelming capability to shape the international system. Realists like Mearsheimer define it by material dominance. Others stress that a hegemon leads mainly by influence, while other states keep their formal sovereignty.
In the game: The Rising Power wins at the hegemony line.
PowerPoint: Hegemony; Mearsheimer (2001)
Control over another society's effective sovereignty, its internal as well as external affairs, whether formally (annexation, colonial rule) or informally. Hegemony, by contrast, shapes others' external behaviour.
In the game: Conquest. The ending asks: was this hegemony, or empire?
Doyle, Empires (1986)
Staying out of a confrontation in the hope that another state will bear the cost of checking a rising power. Christensen and Snyder argue this is likely in a multipolar system when defence is thought to have the advantage, as with Germany's rivals in the 1930s.
In the game: Option B, Buck-pass: always safe for you, unless everyone does it.
Christensen and Snyder, International Organization (1990)
Siding with the stronger or more threatening state. For Walt, weak states may bandwagon out of fear; for Schweller, revisionist states may bandwagon for profit, to share the spoils.
In the game: Option C, Bandwagon.
Walt, The Origins of Alliances (1987); Schweller, International Security (1994)
Conceding to a rising power's demands in the hope that it will be satisfied, as Britain and France did with Germany in the 1930s. Historians still debate whether it was a failure of nerve or a rational way to buy time.
In the game: Round III: the Rising Power offers reassurance. If you trust it and stand aside, you are in the appeasers' position, though here you concede nothing directly.
Lecture: the Second World War
States balance against threats, not power alone. Threat comes from aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability and perceived aggressive intentions.
In the game: Round III: do you balance against power, or against threat?
Walt (1987)
In a multipolar system, allies bound so tightly that when one goes to war, the others are dragged in, as before 1914. Christensen and Snyder argue this is likely when attack is thought to have the advantage, which makes it the opposite of buck-passing.
In the game: A loose echo: if the coalition holds, its members must balance again next round.
Lecture; Christensen and Snyder (1990).
The system of great-power consultation after Napoleon's defeat, most effective from 1815 to the Crimean War (1853–56). It is often seen as balance of power's greatest success, though some scholars argue it worked because it went beyond balance-of-power politics.
In the game: Round II
Schroeder (1992)
Mazrui's critique: in great-power bargaining, colonies were treated as assets to be traded.
In the game: Conquered states: your power now belongs to the Rising Power.
Mazrui (1968)
In European history from 1495 to 1999, once a leading state held a third or more of military capabilities, balancing coalitions formed 55% of the time, against 30% for weaker leads.
In the game: The blue line on the meter.
Levy and Thompson, Security Studies (2005)
A system with a single dominant power. Krauthammer called the post-Cold War period of US preponderance "the unipolar moment". Walt (2005) observed that power was "about as unbalanced as it has ever been, yet balancing tendencies are remarkably mild", which is a puzzle for balance of power theory. Unipolarity is a distribution of capabilities; hegemony is a relationship of influence over other states.
In the game: The “unbalanced world” ending.
Krauthammer, Foreign Affairs (1990/91); Walt (2005); Monteiro, as cited in the lecture.
Using non-military tools, such as diplomacy, institutions and economic statecraft, to delay, frustrate or raise the cost of a dominant state's actions without directly challenging its military power. Critics ask whether this is balancing at all, or just ordinary diplomatic bargaining.
In the game: Not modelled in the game: a good debrief question.
Pape, International Security (2005); T.V. Paul, International Security (2005); Brooks and Wohlforth, International Security (2005)
Leaders in the Third World align to counter threats to their own rule, internal as well as external, not only threats to their state.
In the game: Round IV, Coup.
Steven David, as cited in the lecture
"All-under-heaven": a classical Chinese ideal of a hierarchical but harmonious order, with legitimacy from moral authority rather than coercion. Contemporary Chinese IR has revived it, notably Zhao Tingyang, as an inclusive model of world order. Critics argue it describes a Sinocentric hierarchy.
In the game: Round IV, Tribute (the game compresses it into one offer).
Zhao Tingyang, All under Heaven (2021); Callahan, International Studies Review (2008).
Under the Ming and Qing, rulers kept relations with China through tribute missions, investiture and symbolic recognition of the emperor rather than treaty obligations, often gaining trade in return. "Tributary system" is a modern label associated with John Fairbank, and scholars debate how systematic it really was.
In the game: Round IV, Tribute: send tribute and keep your flag.
Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order (1968)
Increasing a peripheral state's capacity to make its own decisions in a world of dependence, through regional alliances and economic integration.
In the game: Round IV, Autonomy.
Tickner; Puig and Jaguaribe, as cited in the lecture
Preponderance produces peace and parity produces danger: war is most likely when a dissatisfied challenger catches up with or overtakes the dominant power. The opposite of balance of power's prediction.
In the game: Debrief Question 4: which round came closest to parity?
Organski and Kugler, as cited in the lecture
Status quo states want to keep the existing order; revisionist states want to change it. Mearsheimer argues there are no status quo powers except hegemons.
In the game: The secret types.
Mearsheimer (2001); Schweller (1994)
Schweller's typology of states by their interests: lions defend the status quo at high cost; lambs are weak and pay little; jackals bandwagon for profit; wolves are predators seeking to overturn the order.
In the game: The secret types (the Rising Power is the wolf). Their win conditions are the game's own, not Schweller's.
Schweller (1994): not in the lecture notes; check the article
In the seminar version these are only labels for voting weight (3, 2 and 1). Each term has its own literature, which the game does not attempt to represent.
In the game: Seminar: your state's power.
Game labels
The pictures of the lion, the lamb (a sheep), the jackal (a fox) and the Rising Power (a wolf) are icons from game-icons.net, used under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 licence (CC BY 3.0). They have been recoloured.